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Abstract 
 
This article responds to some of the issues raised by Marais and 
Pretorius in their 2015 article titled "A Contextual Analysis of the 
Hate Speech Provisions of the Equality Act" published in 
2015(18)4 PER 901. In particular, the authors in the present 
response deal with a) the relationship between the prohibition of 
unfair discrimination and the regulation of hate speech; b) Marais 
and Pretorius' interpretation of aspects of the section 10(1) hate 
speech test; c) the role and interpretation of the proviso in 
section 12; and d) the constitutionality of section 10(1), as read 
with the proviso. For each of these issues, the authors first 
summarise Marais and Pretorius' contentions and then reply 
thereto. The authors also propose amendments to the threshold 
test for hate speech in terms of section 10(1) and suggest the 
enactment of new hate speech-specific defences. 
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1  Introduction 
In their article entitled "A Contextual Analysis of the Hate Speech Provisions 
of the Equality Act",1 Marais and Pretorius deliver an interesting and 
thought-provoking interpretation of the meaning and constitutionality of 
section 10(1) of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act (the Equality Act),2 as read with the proviso in section 12 
of the Act. The contribution is worthy of a response. 
Section 10(1) of the Equality Act prohibits hate speech and provides as 
follows: 
Subject to the proviso in section 12, no person may publish, propagate, 
advocate or communicate words based on one or more of the prohibited 
grounds, against any person, that could reasonably be construed to 
demonstrate a clear intention to- 
a) be hurtful; 
b) be harmful or incite harm;  
c) promote or propagate hatred. 
Section 12 of the Act prohibits types of expression as a form of unfair 
discrimination and contains a proviso to both sections 10(1) and 12. It 
provides that: 
No person may- 
a)  disseminate or broadcast any information; 
b)  publish or display any advertisement or notice that could reasonably be 
construed or reasonably be understood to demonstrate a clear intention 
to unfairly discriminate against any person. Provided that bona fide 
engagement in artistic creativity, academic and scientific inquiry, fair and 
accurate reporting in the public interest or publication of any information, 
advertisement or notice in accordance with section 16 of the Constitution 
is not precluded by this section. 
Section 7(a) of the Act also regulates expression as a form of unfair 
discrimination. It provides that: 
Subject to section 6, no person may unfairly discriminate against another 
person on the grounds of race, including (a) the dissemination of any 
propaganda or idea, which propounds the racial superiority or inferiority of 
                                            
  Joanna C Botha. BA LLB (Rhodes), LLD (NMMU). Lecturer, Department of Public 
Law, NMMU, South Africa. Email: joanna.botha@nmmu.ac.za. 
  Avinash Govindjee. BA LLB (Rhodes), LLM (UPE), LLD (NMMU). Executive Dean, 
Faculty of Law, NMMU, South Africa. Email: avinash.govindjee@nmmu.ac.za. 
1  Marais and Pretorius 2015 PER 901. 
2  Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (the 
Equality Act). 
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such person, including incitement to, or participation in, any form of racial 
violence. 
The requirements for prohibited speech in sections 7(a), 10(1) and 12 of the 
Equality Act create many interpretative challenges.3 The test for hate 
speech in section 10(1) is significantly broader than the definition for hate 
speech in the Constitution4 and is therefore open to constitutional 
challenge.5 There is considerable doubt about the meaning and intended 
application of sections 7(a) and 12. It is debatable whether these provisions 
regulate hate speech per se or whether they prohibit speech as a form of 
unfair discrimination. The proviso in section 12 has also caused 
interpretative difficulty. The position is compounded by the fact that the Act's 
objectives indicate that the drafters regarded the prohibition of unfair 
discrimination and hate speech as inter-related, yet the two are separately 
regulated.6 
Marais and Pretorius correctly point out that the prohibited speech 
provisions in the Equality Act must be interpreted contextually and 
purposively in the light of the Act's objectives. They also stress that it is 
incorrect to construe section 10(1) only with reference to the constitutional 
right to freedom of expression and the hate speech limitation in section 
16(2)(c) of the Constitution. They argue that the more appropriate context 
for an interpretation of section 10(1) is sections 9(3) and (4) of the 
Constitution, which provide that neither the state nor any person may 
unfairly discriminate against another person on a prohibited ground and that 
national legislation must be enacted to regulate such conduct.7 
We agree that the meaning and constitutionality of the speech provisions in 
the Equality Act must be analysed in the light of the Act's structure and 
objectives and with reference to the various remedies available to redress 
                                            
3 See generally Albertyn, Goldblatt and Roederer Introduction 2-4; Teichner 2003 
SAJHR 349. For a recent and detailed account, see Botha Hate Speech. 
4  Section 16(2)(c) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
5 Jon Qwelane has launched a constitutional challenge against s 10(1) following an 
Equality Court judgment that his column and an accompanying cartoon amounted to 
hate speech. See SAHRC v Qwelane (Eqc) (unreported) case number 44/EqJhb of 
31 May 2011; Qwelane v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2015 2 
SA 493 (GJ). The judgment in SAHRC v Qwelane 2017 4 All SA 234 (GJ) was 
delivered in August 2017, after this article was accepted for publication. We do not 
agree with the decision. 
6 Teichner 2003 SAJHR 352; Albertyn, Goldblatt and Roederer Introduction 4. 
7  Marais and Pretorius 2015 PER 902. The Equality Act is the enabling legislation in 
question. 
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infringements.8 We also agree that the Act was enacted to give effect to the 
constitutional guarantee of equality and to ensure the transformation of 
South African society. 
We add, however, that the Act was enacted as a remedial human rights 
statute and as the intended legal instrument for transforming South African 
society.9 To this end, the Act's preamble contains a number of 
transformative and reconciliatory ideals. It acknowledges, for example, that 
the systemic inequalities of the past and unfair discrimination remain 
pervasive in society and that the consolidation of the democracy requires 
their eradication. It also records that the Act was enacted to facilitate the 
transition to a democratic country, both united and diverse, which upholds 
constitutional values, and which is "marked by human relations that are 
caring and compassionate". The Act's objectives, listed in section 2, repeat 
these goals and resonate with the transformative constitutional mandate.10 
Thus, when interpreting the prohibited speech provisions in the Act, it is 
important to take into account that the Act was enacted as a legal means to 
create a more egalitarian society in which discrimination is overcome and 
reconciliation promoted and where the inherent dignity of all persons is 
respected.11 This position notwithstanding, care must be taken not to 
conflate hate speech and unfair discrimination. Whilst the two are often 
causally linked, they must be treated as separate legal concepts. 
In this contribution, we respond to some of the issues raised by Marais and 
Pretorius. In particular, we deal with a) the relationship between the 
prohibition of unfair discrimination and the regulation of hate speech;12 b) 
Marais and Pretorius' interpretation of aspects of the section 10(1) hate 
speech test; c) the role and interpretation of the proviso in section 12; and 
d) the constitutionality of section 10(1), as read with the proviso. For each 
of these issues, we first summarise Marais and Pretorius' contentions and 
then reply thereto. Thereafter, we propose amendments to the threshold 
                                            
8  Also see s 3(3), which emphasises contextual interpretation. See Albertyn, Goldblatt 
and Roederer Introduction 18; Bohler-Muller and Tait 2000 Obiter 410. 
9 For a discussion of the drafting history, see Gutto Equality and Non-Discrimination 
in South Africa 17-95. 
10 Section 2(b)(i)-(v) of the Equality Act. 
11 Krüger Racism and Law 151-152. The Act was also enacted to facilitate South 
Africa's international law obligations and must be interpreted with reference to 
relevant international law and comparable foreign law. See s 3 and s 233 of the 
Constitution. 
12  We have also dealt with this issue in Botha and Govindjee 2016 SAJHR 304-305 
and Botha and Govindjee 2017 Stell LR 245, but expand our argument here in the 
light of Marais and Pretorius's contribution. 
JC BOTHA & A GOVINDJEE  PER / PELJ 2017 (20)  5 
test for hate speech in terms of section 10(1) and also suggest the 
enactment of new hate speech-specific defences. 
2  The link between unfair discrimination and hate speech 
Marais and Pretorius contend that the type of "discriminatory expression" 
falling within the ambit of section 10(1) of the Equality Act should not be 
equated with the form of hate speech excluded from constitutional 
protection in terms of section 16(2)(c) of the Constitution.13 They argue that 
the expression envisaged by section 16(2)(c) is "only expression of the most 
severe and deeply-felt, group related contempt that constitutes incitement 
to harm and imperils democracy".14 They claim that the prohibition in section 
10(1) aims to regulate low-grade discriminatory expression which demeans, 
hurts and degrades people on the basis of group characteristics and which 
does not promote equality.15 
The authors reason that the meaning and constitutionality of section 10(1) 
must be tested by determining whether the expression prohibited thereby 
meets the fairness standard (for discrimination) and ultimately whether the 
prohibited expression fosters or inhibits equality.16 The authors believe that 
the prohibition of hate speech could have been included within the ambit of 
section 6 of the Equality Act, which prohibits unfair discrimination generally, 
but suggest that a specific hate speech prohibition was enacted to enable 
the Act to achieve its objectives. They also argue that expression falling 
within the parameters of section 10(1) constitutes a form of unfair 
discrimination (in the sense that the speech creates disadvantage by 
promoting inequality and prejudice in society), but that a categorical 
prohibition was introduced to circumvent the need for hate speech 
complainants to prove the unfair discrimination requirements on a case-by-
case basis.17 
As indicated earlier, we agree that the underlying purpose of the Equality 
Act is to give effect to the constitutional right to equality by providing legal 
mechanisms aimed at overcoming unfair discrimination. We do not agree, 
however, with the conflation of hate speech and unfair discrimination. We 
                                            
13  Marais and Pretorius 2015 PER 902-903. 
14  We believe that this interpretation sets the bar too high, but do not address this issue 
here. We have analysed the meaning of the constitutional test for hate speech 
elsewhere. See Botha and Govindjee 2014 SACJ 145-153 and Botha and Govindjee 
2016 SAJHR 297-302. 
15  Marais and Pretorius 2015 PER 903. 
16  Marais and Pretorius 2015 PER 903-904. 
17  Marais and Pretorius 2015 PER 906. 
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argue that it is essential that hate speech and discrimination be recognised 
as independent concepts, with their own separate causes of action, even 
though the two are causally connected and the Act's objectives indicate that 
their prohibition is inter-related.18 There is, in fact, a somewhat troubled 
relationship in the Act between the measures used to regulate hate speech 
and discriminatory speech, often causing confusion. This problem cannot 
be resolved with reference to section 10(1) only. Such an approach would 
be unjustifiably narrow. Both sections 7(a) and 12 must be considered and 
it is necessary to juxtapose the Act's treatment of hate speech with the 
regulation of unfair discrimination. 
Section 6 of the Equality Act provides that no one may discriminate unfairly 
against another person.19 Sections 7, 8 and 9 then prohibit unfair 
discrimination on specific grounds. The definition of discrimination in the Act 
comprises three elements, namely: a) a direct or indirect act or omission;20 
b) that causes harm by imposing a burden or withholding a benefit; and c) 
on a prohibited ground.21 Discrimination thus involves an element of harm, 
arising either from the imposition of a burden or the denial of a positive 
benefit. It is not necessary to prove an intention to discriminate.22 The focus 
is on the impact of the discriminatory conduct in issue. 
Once the complainant has proved these three elements, discrimination is 
established and the respondent must then prove that the discrimination was 
not unfair. Section 14 of the Act contains a legislative test for determining 
fairness. Section 14(2) provides that when determining unfairness, a court 
must have regard to the context; the list of factors in section 14(3);23 and 
whether the discrimination reasonably and justifiably differentiates between 
people on objective criteria intrinsic to the activity concerned.24 
                                            
18 See Botha and Govindjee 2016 SAJHR 304; Teichner 2003 SAJHR 352; Kok 2001 
TSAR 297; Kok and Botha 2014 Litnet Akademies 208-209. 
19 "Discriminate" is defined in s 1(1)(viii) of the Equality Act. 
20  Discrimination is direct (where there is a direct link between the discrimination and a 
prohibited ground) or indirect (where an apparently impartial act has a harmful effect 
on a person or persons identified by a prohibited ground). See Albertyn, Goldblatt 
and Roederer Introduction 33-34. 
21 Albertyn, Goldblatt and Roederer Introduction 33. 
22 Albertyn, Goldblatt and Roederer Introduction 34-35; City Council of Pretoria v 
Walker 1998 2 SA 363 (CC) para 43. 
23  The list of factors in s 14(3) is broad. They appear to be based on a combination of 
the criteria taken into account by the Constitutional Court in Harksen v Lane 1988 1 
SA 300 (CC) (hereafter Harksen) and those applied during a limitation enquiry in 
terms of s 36 of the Constitution. See generally Krüger 2011 SALJ 479, 480; MEC 
for Education: Kwa-Zulu Natal v Pillay 2008 1 SA 474 (CC) paras 70, 137, 168. 
24 Harksen paras 51-53. 
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In summary, the scheme underlying the unfair discrimination provisions in 
the Act is that a complainant must firstly advance a prima facie case of 
discrimination on a prohibited (or analogous) ground. The onus then shifts 
to the respondent to prove either that the discrimination did not occur or that 
none of the prohibited grounds apply.25 Once it has been determined that 
there is a case of discrimination, the respondent must prove that the 
discrimination was not unfair.26 
It is thus clear that the test for unfair discrimination in section 6 of the Act 
differs substantially from the section 10(1) requirements for hate speech. 
Firstly, the hate speech elements do not correlate with the unfair 
discrimination requirements. The test for discrimination focuses on the 
effect of the discriminatory conduct as opposed to the perpetrator's intent, 
whereas the test for hate speech requires that the words used demonstrate 
a clear intention to be hurtful, harmful or to incite hatred. Additionally, the 
hate speech test does not contain a comparator.27 Secondly, the Act clearly 
distinguishes between hate speech and discrimination, because section 15 
specifically provides that hate speech is not subject to a section 14 fairness 
determination. Thirdly, an act or omission which unfairly imposes a burden 
or withholds a benefit on a prohibited ground is not comparable to speech 
that propagates hatred on a prohibited ground. As Kok and Botha point out, 
unfair discrimination and hate speech have separate causes of action (both 
in terms of the Equality Act and generally) and a conflation of the two 
concepts causes uncertainty.28 The authors warn that if the requirements 
for discrimination are applied in cases of hate speech, the Act's aims 
(promoting human dignity and reconciliation) will be undermined.29 
Marais and Pretorius argue, nonetheless, that hate speech as prohibited by 
section 10(1) is a sub-set of unfair discrimination and that a separate hate 
speech prohibition was introduced mainly to accommodate the evidentiary 
                                            
25 Section 13(1) of the Equality Act. Also see Kok 2008 SAJHR 449. 
26 Section 14 of the Equality Act. The respondent bears a full burden as opposed to an 
evidentiary burden, easing the complainant's evidentiary burden. 
27 Krüger Racism and Law 162, 173-174. This view assumes that a comparator is 
logically presumed in the test for discrimination. Also see Kok 2001 TSAR 297; Gutto 
Equality and Non-Discrimination in South Africa 151. 
28 Kok and Botha 2014 Litnet Akademies 208-209; Kok 2001 TSAR 297. 
29 Kok and Botha 2014 Litnet Akademies 208-209; Kok 2001 TSAR 297. With 
reference to ss 7(a) and 12 of the Equality Act, which prohibit specific types of 
expressive conduct under the guise of unfair discrimination, Krüger and Albertyn et 
al also acknowledge that the Act conflates unfair discrimination with hate speech, 
unnecessarily complicating the application of these provisions. See Krüger Racism 
and Law 162, 173-174; Albertyn, Goldblatt and Roederer Introduction 58, adding s 
7(a) appears to be a repetition of s 10 and could be construed as an alternative 
means for the regulation of racist hate speech 
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burden of complainants. They add that the constitutionality of section 10(1) 
must be tested with reference to the fairness standard for discrimination.30 
There are thus two conflicting approaches: a) hate speech and unfair 
discrimination are separate phenomena and should not be confused and b) 
the type of hate speech regulated by section 10(1) of the Act is a form of 
unfair discrimination. We submit that the true position lies midway between 
these poles. Hate speech and unfair discrimination must be treated as 
distinct concepts with their own individual requirements, but the connection 
between the two is not as remote as suggested by some commentators. 
This is because hate speech has the tendency to promote or perpetuate 
unfair discrimination, particularly when directed at vulnerable groups in 
society. Indeed, it is recognised internationally that it is necessary to 
regulate hate propaganda because it seeks to delegitimise the members of 
target groups and has the tendency to create a climate in which the 
marginalisation and stereotyping of vulnerable groups is encouraged, 
justifying discriminatory treatment.31 Hate speech, in other words, fosters 
the creation of a society best described as the antithesis of the constitutional 
ideal. Thus, the regulation of both hate speech and the regulation of unfair 
discrimination have a common objective, namely the protection of human 
dignity and equality and the eradication of systemic discrimination. 
We therefore argue that sections 7(a) and 12 of the Equality Act, which are 
often criticised for causing an unnecessary tension between hate speech 
and unfair discrimination, should be interpreted as prohibitions which are 
intended not to regulate hate speech per se but public expression against 
target groups where the "speaker" demonstrates an intention to discriminate 
against the group or to incite such discrimination. Poor legislative drafting 
has obscured the true purpose of these provisions.32 For example, it seems 
that the section 7(a) and 12 prohibitions are seldom applied in practice, even 
where the conduct complained of falls squarely within the ambit of either 
provision.33 It is probable that this may be a consequence of a 
                                            
30 Marais and Pretorius 2015 PER 906. Also see Krüger Racism and Law 162, 173-
174; Albertyn, Goldblatt and Roederer Introduction 58. Krüger believes that hate 
speech is closely linked to unfair discrimination. She claims that all forms of hate 
speech infringe the right to human dignity and lead to negative stereotyping and the 
vilification of targeted groups. 
31 Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v Whatcott 2013 SCC 11 paras 71, 74, 
114 (hereafter Whatcott); General Recommendation No 35: Combating Racist Hate 
Speech UN Doc CERD/C/GC/35 (2013) (hereafter General Recommendation No 
35). 
32  Also see our argument in Botha and Govindjee 2016 SAJHR 304.  
33 See Democratic Alliance v Volkraad Verkiesing Kommissie (SAHRC) (unreported) 
case number MP1213/0024 of 5 December 2013 and Thiem v MacKay (SAHRC) 
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misunderstanding of their complex requirements, which combine elements 
of unfair discrimination and hate speech. 
To this end, whilst recognising the causal link between hate speech and 
discrimination, we argue that better practice dictates that they remain 
separate. This approach ensures that the prevention of acts of 
discrimination and hate speech is afforded proper attention and that both 
are regulated with due regard to their own specific requirements and their 
own particular "harms". Moreover, the constitutionality of the hate speech 
prohibition in section 10(1) must be tested not with reference to the fairness 
standard for discrimination, but by way of a proportionality analysis aimed 
at striking an appropriate balance between freedom of expression, on the 
one hand, and human dignity and equality, on the other. We believe that the 
test proposed by Marais and Pretorius favours equality at the expense of 
freedom of expression. 
Our suggested approach accords with that in international law where it is 
accepted that the phenomena of discrimination and hate speech are 
distinguishable. Both the International Convention on the Elimination of all 
Forms of Racial Discrimination ("ICERD")34 and the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (the "ICCPR")35 treat discrimination and hate 
speech as separate but inter-related concepts. Article 20 of the ICCPR, for 
example, requires States parties to enact legislation to prohibit the 
"advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement 
to discrimination, hostility or violence".36 Article 26 of the ICCPR, on the 
other hand, entitles everyone to equality. States parties must prohibit unfair 
discrimination and "guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection 
against discrimination" on a prohibited ground.37 The United Nations Human 
Rights Committee ("UNHRC") explains that although undefined in the 
ICCPR, the term "discrimination" should be interpreted as defined in ICERD, 
namely "any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference which is based 
on any ground … and which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or 
impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal 
                                            
(unreported) case number FS/1314/0083 of 18 September 2013 for examples of 
cases where s 12 would have found proper application. 
34 International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(1965) (hereafter ICERD). 
35 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) (hereafter ICCPR). 
36  Section 16(2)(c) of the Constitution is modeled on this limitation. 
37  Also see aa 2, 3, 4, 14, 15, 23, 24 of the ICCPR – all of which deal with the right to 
equality. 
JC BOTHA & A GOVINDJEE  PER / PELJ 2017 (20)  10 
footing, of all rights and freedoms".38 Thus, the advocacy of hatred which 
incites to discrimination in terms of Article 20(2) "is not concerned with 
differentiation alone" and there is a distinction between the obligation to 
regulate hate speech that incites to discrimination and the prevention of acts 
of discrimination.39 
ICERD treats discrimination and hate speech similarly. Whilst Articles 2 and 
5 require States parties to eliminate all forms of racial discrimination, Article 
4(a), upon which section 7(a) of the Equality Act is modelled, demands that 
States parties take positive steps to criminalise the dissemination of ideas 
based on racial superiority or hatred; incitement to racial discrimination; and 
incitement to acts of violence against a target group. In General 
Recommendation No 35 the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination ("CERD") distinguishes between the phenomena of 
discrimination and hate speech by specifically referring to the speech forms 
in Article 4(a) as "racist hate speech". Such speech, says CERD, should be 
interpreted "as a form of other-directed speech which rejects the core 
human rights principles of human dignity and equality and seeks to degrade 
the standing of individuals and groups in the estimation of society".40 CERD 
has recognised that hate speech creates a climate of racial hatred and 
discrimination and stresses that Article 4 is critical to the struggle to 
eliminate racial discrimination.41 Thus, the purpose of ICERD is to safeguard 
vulnerable groups from instances of discrimination and hate speech.42 
In many foreign jurisdictions, including the United Kingdom, Australia and 
Canada, hate speech and unfair discrimination are separately regulated and 
dealt with as definitive concepts with their own specific elements.43 
Moreover, academic writers worldwide regularly use the distinction between 
hate speech and unfair discrimination to defend the enactment of hate 
speech-specific laws or to substantiate their illegitimacy. For example, in the 
United States the critical race theorists suggest that hate speech is far 
                                            
38  General Comment No 18: Non-discrimination UN Doc HRI/GEN.1.Rev.9 (1989) para 
8.  
39  Ghanea 2010 IJMGR 430. 
40  General Recommendation No 35 paras 5, 6 and 10. 
41  General Recommendation No 35 para 5; General Recommendation No 15: 
Organized Violence based on Ethnic Origin UN Doc GA/48/18 (1993) para 1. 
42  Thornberry "Forms of Hate Speech and ICERD" 22-23. 
43  See generally Gelber and McNamara 2015 Law & Soc'y Rev 631, 636-637; Sumner 
"Incitement and the Regulation of Hate Speech" 209-210; R v Keegstra 1990 3 SCR 
697 para 60; Whatcott paras 58, 81-83; Rosenfeld "Hate Speech in Constitutional 
Jurisprudence" 259-265. 
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worse than mere discrimination and constitutes a form of "violence with 
words", justifying separate regulation.44 
We thus argue that it is incorrect to relegate hate speech as a sub-set of 
unfair discrimination. Consequently, the constitutionality of section 10(1) of 
the Equality Act should not be tested with reference to the fairness standard 
for discrimination, as suggested by Marais and Pretorius. A preferable 
approach is to apply the requirements in section 36 of the Constitution to 
determine whether the limitation to freedom of expression in section 10(1) 
appropriately balances the rights to freedom of expression, human dignity 
and equality, and is a necessary, rational and proportionate measure, to the 
extent that it responds to a grave social need and is the least intrusive 
measure available to protect the interest identified.45 
3  The section 10(1) elements 
It is trite that the test for hate speech in section 10(1) of the Equality Act is 
broader than the constitutional threshold test. Many of the established 
requirements for a hate speech regulator have been omitted from the test: 
hurt and hatred are conflated; the focus is on demeaning inter-personal 
speech as opposed to that which stereotypes the target group; the 
communication of words is actionable; incitement to hatred is not necessary; 
and the speech need not cause harm. For this reason, the prohibition has 
been criticised for widening the net of prohibited speech to include a wide 
range of speech forms within its ambit.46 
In this contribution we restrict our comments to the elements of the section 
10(1) test as discussed by Marais and Pretorius. 
                                            
44  Delgado and Stefanic "Words that Wound" 23-24, 90. Ronald Dworkin uses the 
distinction between hate speech and unfair discrimination to justify his political 
legitimacy theory. He argues that whilst discrimination laws are needed to protect 
vulnerable people in society from harm, hate speech laws cannot be justified, 
because opponents to anti-discrimination laws must be able to voice their objections 
thereto. Thus, hate speech is the price we pay for the legitimacy of discrimination 
laws. See Dworkin "Foreword" vii - viii. For a counter to this theory, see Waldron The 
Harm in Hate Speech 178-179, 182-183. 
45 General Comment No 34: Article 19: Freedoms of Opinion and Expression UN Doc 
CCPR/C/GC/34 (2011) (General Comment No 34) paras 22, 33-34. 
46  See generally De Vos 2010 PULP Fictions 10; Pillay 2013 SAPL 239; Teichner 2003 
SAJHR 380; Kok and Botha 2014 Litnet Akademies 206. 
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3.1  "No person may publish, propagate, advocate or communicate 
words" 
Firstly, Marais and Pretorius state that the term "words" in section 10(1) is 
far too restrictive, especially when contrasted with the terminology used in 
section 16 of the Constitution.47 We agree. The constitutional right to 
freedom of expression is widely interpreted to include any action or conduct 
which communicates meaning.48Furthermore, it is recognised in both 
international and foreign law that put bans on hate speech aim to address 
expression which exposes target groups to hatred.49 Thus, "words" should 
be replaced with the term "expression" or "acts of expression". 
Secondly, Marais and Pretorius argue that the "publish, propagate, 
advocate or communicate" element in section 10(1) should be amended to 
provide that no person may propagate, advocate or communicate 
expressive content which meets the other section 10(1) requirements. They 
add that the provision should be interpreted to exclude private 
conversations despite the use of the word "communicate".50 We disagree 
and also do not accept that the wording of the proviso provides a solution 
by limiting the ambit of the hate speech test. In fact, the inclusion of 
"communicate" in section 10(1) is highly problematic. This term does not 
mandate that the expression be disseminated to a public audience and 
permits the regulation of a broad range of private speech (even where the 
speaker does not intend to advocate hatred or incite harm and even if a 
member of the target group does not hear the speech).51 
We contend that private communications should not be included in a hate 
speech prohibition. We propose the insertion of a "publicity" element in 
section 10(1), namely that the speech should occur in the hearing or 
presence of the public in a public place or that it should be published or 
                                            
47  Marais and Pretorius 2015 PER 907. 
48 De Reuck v Director of Public Prosecutions, Witwatersrand Local Division 2004 1 
SA 406 (CC) para 48. 
49 See aa 19(3) and 20 of the ICCPR; a 4 of ICERD; General Comment No 34 para 50; 
General Recommendation No 35 para 7. Hate speech may occur indirectly and 
include non-verbal forms of speech, such as the display of racist symbols at public 
gatherings. 
50  Marais and Pretorius 2015 PER 908-909. 
51 Krüger Racism and Law 166; Kok and Botha 2014 Litnet Akademies 206; De Vos 
2011 http://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/malema-judgment-a-re-think-on-hate-
speech-needed/ 
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disseminated to the public.52 The recognised purpose of hate speech 
regulation is to remedy the effects of such speech and the harm that it 
causes, whether to a target group or to the broader societal well-being. The 
speech must expose the target group to hatred and be likely to perpetuate 
negative stereotyping and unfair discrimination. It is improbable that most 
private conversations will have this effect. 
We acknowledge that the preamble to the Equality Act reflects the need to 
transform individual attitudes and to promote reconciliation. It is therefore 
arguable that hateful private conversations about target groups should be 
regulated. The purpose of hate speech laws, however, is not to censor mere 
ideas (even if repugnant). A ban must focus on the "mode of expression" – 
public speech which exposes target groups to hatred and which is likely to 
cause harm. And, whilst the regulation of this type of speech may not 
necessarily "compel anyone to think correctly",53 the regulation of hate 
speech which occurs publicly sets a normative benchmark and has the 
potential to shape future behaviour.54 
Another problematic area with this part of the section 10(1) test is that the 
words "publish", "propagate" and "communicate" do not necessarily entail 
an intention to promote hatred. "Advocate" is a far more forceful verb. As 
we discuss below, however, the lack of intention for a hate speech 
prohibition in human rights legislation does not necessarily render the 
prohibition too broad, because the effect or impact of the speech should be 
the critical factor. The speech must occur publicly, expose the target group 
to hatred, and cause harm. We therefore submit that the use of the words 
"publish" and "propagate" in section 10(1) is not overly problematic, but that 
the inclusion of private communications within its ambit over-reaches and is 
not rationally connected to the Act's purpose. A solution would be to sever 
the term "communicate" from section 10(1). But, as the threshold test for 
hate speech in section 10(1) is replete with difficulties, a better solution 
would be to amend the provision in its entirety (as we explain below). 
                                            
52 See, for example, the definition of a "public place" in s 319(7) of the Canadian 
Criminal Code. 
53 Whatcott paras 51, 58. Compare the criticism of Cameron 2013 SCLR 33. 
54 Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie 2006 1 SA 524 (CC) para 138; Sarat and Kearns 
"Beyond the Great Divide" 30-31. 
JC BOTHA & A GOVINDJEE  PER / PELJ 2017 (20)  14 
3.2  That could reasonably be construed to demonstrate a clear 
intention 
Marais and Pretorius properly point out that this part of the section 10(1) 
test creates an objective test and that the intention to propagate hatred must 
be determined both from the perspective of the speaker and from that of the 
target group.55 The authors add that an analysis of the meaning of the words 
used by the speaker assists when interpreting what the speaker intended to 
communicate.56 We agree that section 10(1) creates an objective test for 
intention and that the impact of the speech on the target group should not 
be the decisive factor. We stress, in addition, that neither the subjective 
intention of the victim, nor the perspective of the author of the message, 
should be preferred because this approach would permit subjectivity to 
cloud the analysis.57 Instead, it must be established whether the reasonable 
person, aware of the context and circumstances surrounding the 
publication, would regard the publication as demonstrating an intention on 
the speaker's part to expose the target group to hatred and be likely to cause 
harm. Moreover, whilst the meaning of the words used by the speaker plays 
an important role in this enquiry, this analysis should not be elevated to a 
level where sight is lost of the ultimate determination, as arguably occurred 
in Afri-forum v Malema.58 The Court, in this case, misconstrued the section 
10(1) test in an attempt to solve the apparent problem of the meaning of the 
song in issue. Instead, the Court merely had to ascertain whether the 
reasonable person, aware of the context, would regard the song's 
publication as demonstrating an intention to expose the target group to hurt, 
harm, or hatred. It was unnecessary to prove that Malema subjectively 
intended the words to cause harm. It was also unnecessary to ascertain 
whether everybody in society understood what the words meant whenever 
Malema sang the song. 
We acknowledge that a number of academic commentators have criticised 
the lack of a subjective intention requirement in section 10(1).59 We have 
previously argued that the use of an objective test to determine a 
hatemonger's intention in remedial human rights legislation is acceptable, 
provided that the hate speech prohibition is carefully crafted to regulate the 
                                            
55  Marais and Pretorius 2015 PER 911-912. 
56  Marais and Pretorius 2015 PER 912. 
57 Compare the approach in Herselman v Geleba (E) (unreported) case number 
231/2009 of 1 September 2011 21, 24 where the Court focused on the views of the 
recipient community. 
58  Afri-forum v Malema 2011 6 SA 240 (Eqc) paras 55, 103, 109. 
59  See Albertyn, Goldblatt and Roederer Introduction 92-93, 95; Teichner 2003 SAJHR 
380; De Vos 2010 PULP Fictions 11. 
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promotion of hatred against target groups.60 At this level the focus should 
be on remedying the harm caused by hate speech, as opposed to the 
subjective intention of the hatemonger.61 This approach augments the 
objectives of the Equality Act's, namely the promotion of transformation and 
reconciliation in South African society.62 
It is noteworthy that the international standard does not require an intention 
requirement for a hate speech prohibition in anti-discriminatory legislation, 
provided that the provision is narrowly structured and does not regulate 
offensive speech. States parties are entitled to prohibit forms of "hate 
speech" in terms more restrictive than Article 20(2) of the ICCPR.63 States 
parties are also urged to make a clear distinction between expression which 
should attract a criminal sanction and expression which merely justifies a 
discriminatory remedy.64 For criminal liability it is emphasised that the 
speaker must intend to incite harm against the target group.65 According to 
CERD, however, less serious cases should be addressed by means other 
than criminal law, and here the impact of the speech on targeted groups is 
critical.66 
3.3  Against any person and a) be hurtful, or b) be harmful or to incite 
harm or c) promote or propagate hatred 
Marais and Pretorius justify the inclusion of the terms "person" and "hurt" in 
section 10(1) with reference to the Equality Act's stated objectives and its 
remedial purpose. They also suggest that section 10(1) regulates 
expression which hurts a targeted victim and causes harm and that the 
proviso appropriately limits the ambit of the prohibition.67 We disagree. 
                                            
60  Botha and Govindjee 2016 SAJHR 310-311. In any event, intent is usually 
determined objectively by having regard to the context and all relevant 
circumstances, including various objective factors. In hate speech cases such 
factors would include the identity and status of the speaker; the recipient audience; 
the group targeted; the form, manner and reach of the publication; the words used; 
and the impact of the speech. 
61 Canada (Human Rights Commission) v Taylor 1990 3 SCR 892 931-932; Whatcott 
paras 126-127. 
62 See too Krüger Racism and Law 166. 
63 General Comment No 34 paras 51-52. 
64 The Rabat Plan of Action on the Prohibition of Advocacy of National, Racial or 
Religious Hatred that Constitutes Incitement to Discrimination, Hostility or Violence 
(2012) para 19 (hereafter the Rabat Plan). 
65 Rabat Plan para 22. 
66 General Recommendation No 35 para 12. 
67  Marais and Pretorius 2015 PER 910. 
JC BOTHA & A GOVINDJEE  PER / PELJ 2017 (20)  16 
There are a number of problematic features with this component of the 
prohibition, which the proviso does not redress (an issue addressed below). 
Section 10(1) prohibits the publication of words "against any person" on a 
prohibited ground. The emphasis is on speech which demonstrates an 
intention to be hurtful when communicated about any person, as opposed 
to that which vilifies and ostracises the group. The purpose of hate speech 
regulation, however, is not to safeguard the emotional well-being of 
individuals. Instead, as recognised by the Constitutional Court in Islamic 
Unity Convention v Independent Broadcasting Authority, the aim is to 
prohibit expression which "reinforces and perpetuates patterns of 
discrimination and inequality" and which undermines national unity, 
tolerance and reconciliation in society.68 
This is also the case in international and comparative foreign law, where the 
focus is on both the societal impact of the speech and its potential to cause 
harm to the target group.69 Thus, in Saskatchewan (Human Rights 
Commission) v Whatcott the Canadian Supreme Court stressed that "hate 
speech must rise to a level beyond merely impugning individuals: it must 
seek to marginalize the group by affecting its social status and acceptance 
in the eyes of the majority".70 The emotional distress experienced by 
individual group members is not immaterial, but the regulation of hate 
speech, even in human rights legislation, must focus on group harm and not 
individual hurt. The aim is to protect the dignity and social standing of 
susceptible target groups and ultimately the public good.71 
Furthermore, contrary to Marais and Pretorius' interpretation, section 10(1) 
does not include a causal link between the hurt and resultant harm as a 
separate requirement. We argue that the inclusion of hurtful inter-personal 
speech in the threshold test for hate speech in section 10(1) without a link 
with resultant harm does not meet the aim of protecting vulnerable groups 
from hatred and the consequent risk of discrimination against the group. In 
short, this component of the provision is not rationally connected to the 
                                            
68  Islamic Unity Convention v Independent Broadcasting Authority 2002 4 SA 294 (CC) 
paras 29-30, 33, 46. 
69 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to 
Freedom of Opinion and Expression UN Doc A/67/357 (2012) para 44(f). 
70 Whatcott paras 80, 82. 
71 Whatcott paras 80, 82. Similarly, in Whatcott the restriction in issue was declared 
unconstitutional on the grounds that it regulated offensive speech which did not 
expose the target group to hatred. 
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legislative purpose of addressing the marginalisation and systemic 
discrimination of groups and should be omitted from the test. 
Another area of concern is the missing constitutional "incitement to cause 
harm" requirement. Indeed, the wording of sub-sections 10(1)(a), (b) and 
(c) generally is highly problematic. It seems that the drafters wished to 
capture a wide range of speech forms within the provision's ambit. Possibly 
this is why aspects of the constitutional test are replicated here in a 
haphazard fashion. For example, sub-section 10(1)(b) prohibits words 
which could be construed to be harmful or to incite harm. Section 10(1)(c), 
on the other hand, prohibits words that promote or propagate hatred.72 To 
overcome these problems, we recommend an amendment of section 10(1) 
to prohibit expression which promotes hatred against target groups and 
causes harm. An objective test should be applied to determine if there is an 
adequate causal nexus between the speech and the probability of harm. 
Important factors include the identity and status of both speaker and 
audience; the mode and reach of the speech; the content and purpose of 
the speech; the vulnerability of the group; historical patterns of 
discrimination against the group; and relevant social and political 
circumstances.73 
In our view, however, an incitement requirement is not necessary in 
remedial anti-discrimination legislation. Our proposed threshold test 
focuses on the effects of hate speech and is aimed at providing an effective 
means to overcome the recognised harm caused thereby. Because the test 
is an objective one and does not require a subjective intention to advocate 
hatred, it would be illogical to insist that the speaker also intends to incite 
others to cause harm. It is sufficient that the speaker publicly promotes 
hatred against a target group on a prohibited ground, which speech is likely 
to cause harm, either directly or indirectly. 
Notwithstanding our support for the exclusion of the incitement and intention 
requirements in section 10(1), we contend that the threshold test for hate 
speech contained therein is an unjustifiable limitation to the right to freedom 
of expression. We address the constitutionality issue below, but before 
doing so interrogate the meaning and role of the proviso in section 12, which 
                                            
72 In Freedom Front v South African Human Rights Commission 2003 11 BCLR 1283 
(SAHRC) 1298 (hereafter Freedom Front) the SAHRC held that an "adequate nexus" 
between the speech and the harm was needed to render the speech in question hate 
speech. 
73 Freedom Front 1297; General Recommendation No 35 para 15. 
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clearly constrains the ambit of section 10(1), but which may not go far 
enough. 
4  The proviso 
Marais and Pretorius contend that their interpretation of the proviso in 
section 12 of the Equality Act limits the application of the section 10(1) 
prohibition, rendering it constitutionally justifiable. We answer this claim by 
addressing a number of problematic issues. Firstly, we determine the role 
and purpose of the proviso. Does it impose additional requirements for 
liability for sections 10 and 12 or should it be interpreted as a defence? 
Secondly, we examine the individual components of the proviso. Exactly 
what speech forms does it preclude from the ambit of sections 10 and 12? 
Thirdly, we address the question of whether the proviso properly narrows 
the reach of section 10(1). 
4.1  Academic debate: the meaning and purpose of the proviso 
Many authors have debated the meaning and purpose of the proviso. Some 
argue that the proviso should be read as an expanded version of section 
16(1) of the Constitution and that sections 10 and 12 of the Equality Act will 
apply only if the forms of expression specified in the proviso fall within the 
ambit of section 16(2) of the Constitution.74 Others argue that the proviso 
applies only to section 12.75 Another suggestion is that the proviso should 
be treated as a defence to section 10 and 12 claims.76 
Marais and Pretorius compare the link between the proviso and section 
10(1) of the Equality Act to the relationship between sections 16(1) and (2) 
of the Constitution. Then, they claim that the proviso should be construed 
as an internal modifier of sections 10 and 12 of the Equality Act and be 
treated as definitional.77 So a complainant will have to prove that the 
expressive conduct in question falls within the definitional ambit of the 
respective sections, "which excludes expression covered by the proviso". 
The authors assert therefore that the proviso should not be treated as a 
defence to a hate speech complaint.78 In their view, this approach, together 
                                            
74 Albertyn, Goldblatt and Roederer Introduction 93. 
75 Teichner 2003 SAJHR 357. 
76  Kok and Botha 2014 Litnet Akademies 210-211; Bronstein 2006 
https://www.activateleadership.co.za/cells/view/275 24. 
77  Marais and Pretorius 2015 PER 912. 
78 Marais and Pretorius 2015 PER 912; Marais Constitutionality of Categorical and 
Conditional Restrictions 307-308. 
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with their interpretation of the components of the proviso, appropriately 
narrows the reach of section 10. 
4.2  Application of the proviso: requirement or defence? 
Marais and Pretorius' interpretation of the role of the proviso in section 12 
is not persuasive. The suggested connection between section 10(1) of the 
Equality Act, as read with the proviso, and sections 16(1) and (2) of the 
Constitution seems strained. It fails to take into account the role of a proviso 
and the Equality Act's overall purpose. In any event, section 16(2) of the 
Constitution does not prohibit speech and merely defines the ambit of 
freedom of expression by stating that the right "does not extend to …" and 
then lists the three types of expression excluded from constitutional 
protection. It is unclear how section 16(2) is comparable to the proviso, 
which by virtue of its explicit wording and positioning in sections 10 and 12 
was clearly intended to qualify a respondent's liability.79 
In Janse van Rensburg v Minister of Defence the Supreme Court of Appeal 
held that a proviso should ordinarily be construed as an exception or 
qualification to a preceding enactment and that its effect should not be 
interpreted as "enlarging the scope of an enactment when it can be fairly 
and properly construed without attributing to it that effect". Thus, a proviso 
should not be treated as an "independent enacting clause", but as an 
exception "dependent on the main enactment".80 Furthermore, when the 
words "subject to" are used in a proviso, they do not have an a priori 
meaning and it is quite acceptable to interpret them as imposing a limitation 
or exception.81 
The Equality Act was enacted to promote equality and provide the victims 
of hate speech and unfair discrimination with accessible forums to pursue 
complaints. In unfair discrimination cases a low burden is placed on a 
complainant, who is required to make out only a prima facie case of unfair 
discrimination. Marais and Pretorius' interpretation of the proviso requires 
section 10 and 12 complainants to prove the elements of the respective 
prohibitions and to prove that the speech in issue is not exempted speech; 
that is, for example, that it is not the bona fide engagement in artistic 
creativity. When regard is had to the overall scheme and purpose of the 
                                            
79 It follows immediately upon the prohibition in s 12 and reads: "[P]rovided that … it is 
not precluded by this section". The opening words of s 10(1) are "[S]ubject to the 
proviso in s 12 …" 
80 Janse van Rensburg v Minister of Defence 2000 3 SA 54 (SCA) para 11. 
81 Premier of the Eastern Cape Province v Sekeleni 2002 3 All SA 407 (A) paras 13, 
17. 
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Act,82 this interpretation seems unlikely. It requires proof of a negative and 
imposes a very high evidential burden on complainants. It negates the Act's 
objectives and fails to take into account that the Act aims to provide easy 
access to justice for disadvantaged persons.83 Accordingly, we submit that 
the proviso's role is to create a defence for a respondent, who will need to 
prove that the speech falls within its ambit and should thus be precluded 
from prohibition (even though it meets the respective section 10 and 12 
threshold tests). This interpretation is supported by the reality that the 
question of whether a particular publication is bona fide or forms part of an 
academic or scientific enquiry would inevitably fall within the respondent's 
own peculiar knowledge. 
4.3  The meaning of the proviso 
Marais and Pretorius provide a detailed interpretative account of the types 
of expression exempted from liability by the proviso.84 We do not deal with 
each component of the proviso in detail and restrict ourselves to the more 
contentious issues. 
4.3.1  Bona fide engagement 
The first question is whether the "bona fide engagement" requirement 
qualifies all the forms of expression listed in the proviso. Marais and 
Pretorius believe that it does, arguing that this interpretation is textually 
correct.85 Bronstein, on the other hand, does not qualify the "publication of 
any information, advertisement or notice" with the bona fide requirement.86 
Whilst she does not offer an explanation for her interpretation, we submit 
that her approach is grammatically correct and should be accepted. The 
proviso reads "provided that bona fide engagement in artistic creativity … 
or publication of any information …87 If the words "bona fide engagement" 
are reinserted immediately after the word "or" in the proviso, the proviso 
would read as follows: "provided that bona fide engagement publication of 
any information, advertisement or notice …" The result is an overly strained 
and distorted interpretation and one which cannot be justified on the basis 
                                            
82 Section 3(3)(b) provides that when applying and interpreting the Equality Act, the 
purpose of the Act must be considered. 
83 Manong v Department of Roads (No 2) 2009 6 SA 589 (SCA) para 50. 
84  Marais and Pretorius 2015 PER 913-926. 
85 Marais and Pretorius 2015 PER 914.  
86 Bronstein 2006 https://www.activateleadership.co.za/cells/view/275 24-25. 
87 Own emphasis. 
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that it renders section 10, as read with the proviso, constitutionally 
compatible.88 
When will a form of expression be regarded as bona fide? Marais and 
Pretorius contend that this element should be interpreted as requiring a 
"subjective conviction" that the expressive act will achieve its "intrinsic 
purpose", to be assessed in terms of a reasonableness standard.89 We have 
no qualms with this suggestion, but prefer to avoid the use of the phrase "a 
subjective conviction". This terminology could cause confusion when 
juxtaposed with the objective test for intention in section 10(1). The 
jurisprudence that has developed under the Broadcasting Code90 and the 
Films and Publications Act,91 both of which exclude bona fide forms of 
expression (such as documentaries, publications and broadcasts) from their 
application, provides valuable guidance for an interpretation of the bona fide 
requirement in the proviso. The Broadcasting Complaints Tribunal of South 
Africa ("BCTSA") applies an objective contextual test when determining 
whether a particular broadcast is bona fide.92 We submit that an analogous 
approach should be adopted for the proviso. It must be considered whether 
the form of expression in issue, assessed in its entirety and in the light of its 
context and purpose, can genuinely and legitimately be regarded as the 
engagement in artistic creativity, scientific enquiry or fair and accurate 
reporting in the public interest. 
4.3.2 "In accordance with section 16(1) of the Constitution" 
The next question is whether this phrase qualifies all the forms of expression 
listed in the proviso. Marais and Pretorius believe that it does. In support of 
their contention, they point to a link between the forms of expression listed 
in section 16(1) of the Constitution and the proviso.93 Both Krüger and 
Bronstein, however, suggest that the phrase applies only to the last part of 
                                            
88  Section 39(2) of the Constitution; Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic 
Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd. In re: Hyundai Motor Distributors 
(Pty) Ltd v Smit 2001 1 SA 545 (CC) paras 21-24 (hereafter In re: Hyundai); National 
Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 2 SA 1 (CC) 
paras 23-24. 
89  Marais and Pretorius 2015 PER 914. 
90  Clauses 4.2 and 5 of Free-to-Air Code of Conduct for Broadcasting Service 
Licensees (2009). 
91  Sections 16(4) and 22 of the Films and Publications Act 65 of 1996. 
92 See generally Suliman v 5FM 2006 JOL 17677 (BCTSA) para 8; Hamid v Chaifm 
2015 JOL 3343 (BCCSA) para 17. 
93  Marais and Pretorius 2015 PER 913. 
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the proviso, namely the publication of any advertisement, information or 
notice.94 
In our view, the appendage of the phrase "in accordance with section 16(1) 
of the Constitution" to the end of the proviso adds little value to the proviso's 
meaning, regardless of which interpretation is preferred. Neither reading 
permits precision or clarity or provides a meaning placing the provision 
within constitutional bounds.95 In any event, the use of the word "or" before 
"publication" suggests that Krüger and Bronstein's interpretation is 
grammatically and textually correct and should be accepted. Moreover, as 
we argue below, the wording of the last form of expression specified in the 
proviso was probably intended to apply specifically to the section 12 
prohibition and should be dealt with as a separate exception. It seems that 
the drafters attempted to reproduce the essence of section 12 and then to 
preclude such forms of expression from liability if published "in accordance 
with section 16(1) of the Constitution". 
4.3.3 Artistic creativity, academic and scientific enquiry 
We agree with Marais and Pretorius that these components of the proviso 
should be broadly interpreted to include the artistic process, all bona fide art 
forms, such as dramatic productions, comedy shows, and artistic works, and 
bona fide statements made in genuine academic and scientific journals.96 
4.3.4 Fair and accurate reporting in the public interest 
For this part of the proviso, we agree with Marais and Pretorius that the 
closest comparator in South African law is the fair comment defence in 
defamation, as interpreted in The Citizen 1978 (Pty) Ltd v McBride 
("McBride").97 We go further and provide additional commentary on the 
elements of the defence, illustrating that it provides inadequate protection 
for media respondents. In terms of the wording of the proviso, a hate speech 
respondent must prove that the publication amounted to: a) fair and 
accurate reporting; b) in the public interest; and c) bona fide engagement 
therein. It is helpful to interpret these requirements with reference to similar 
                                            
94 Krüger Racism and Law 170; Bronstein 2006 https://www.activate 
leadership.co.za/cells/view/275 24. 
95  In re: Hyundai paras 25-26; Case v Minister of Safety and Security; Curtis v Minister 
of Safety and Security 1996 3 SA 617 (CC) para 79 (hereafter Case v Minister); 
Dawood v Minister for Home Affairs 2000 3 SA 936 (CC) para 47. 
96 See, for example, Manamela v Shapiro (SAHRC) (unreported) case number 
GP/2008/1037E, where the SAHRC held that the cartoonist "acted with bona fide 
artistic creativity in the public interest". 
97  The Citizen 1978 (Pty) Ltd v McBride 2011 4 SA 191 (CC) (hereafter McBride). 
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requirements for the various grounds of justification in the law of 
defamation.98 
In the light of the connection with press and media freedom and the 
requirements of section 12(a), the use of the word "reporting" probably 
refers to a news report, whether in the form of a broadcast, 
telecommunication or newspaper report containing information.99 The 
accuracy requirement means that the reporting must be exact and correct 
in all details. It would not be sufficient, for example, for the gist of the report 
to be true (as is permitted for the defence of truth for public benefit).100 The 
report would probably have to be a factual account or statement containing 
information and not a comment or opinion, as opinions "may be criticised 
for being unreasonable, but rarely for being false".101 
The report must also be fair. In McBride the Court interpreted the "fair" 
requirement for the fair comment defence to mean that the comment should 
be "an honest, genuine (though possibly exaggerated or prejudiced) 
expression of opinion relevant to the facts upon which it was based and not 
disclosing malice" to be objectively determined.102 This interpretation, 
however, was obviously tailored to qualify the "comment" requirement of the 
defence, to be distinguished from a statement of fact. Here, the report must 
be fair. It must also be bona fide, which should be interpreted to mean 
"genuine". So, to construe the use of the word "fair" as honest and genuine 
in the context of the proviso amounts to tautology. A better reading is to use 
the alternative meaning of fair, which as explained in McBride, ordinarily 
means that something is "just, equitable, reasonable, level-headed and 
balanced".103 Thus, the report must be accurate, genuine and it must also 
be reasonable and balanced.104 It must furthermore be in the public interest. 
This concept is an elastic one, but should be interpreted to mean that the 
                                            
98 We recognise that the defences are grounds of justification and that their purpose 
differs from the proviso. 
99 As opposed to a detailed account or formal record of a particular matter, such as a 
report generated by a parliamentary committee or the Public Protector. 
100 Smit v OVS Afrikaanse Pers Bpk 1956 1 SA 768 (O); Times Media Ltd v Nisselow 
2005 1 All SA 567 (A). 
101 McBride paras 144-145, but compare the judgment of Zondo J at para 63 - the 
"regulation of false information" does not include opinions, because an opinion may 
be wrong or unjustified but cannot be false. Only a statement of fact can be false. 
102 McBride para 83. 
103 McBride para 82.  
104 The requirements for the defence of a reasonable publication would thus apply. 
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facts reported must be of public concern and both significant and relevant 
to the reasonable person in society.105 
This portion of the proviso accordingly exempts bona fide, accurate and fair 
reports on matters of public interest. We accept Marais and Pretorius' 
suggestion that the decision in Jersild v Denmark illustrates its potential 
application.106 Unfortunately, however, because the exemption is very 
narrow, it provides limited protection for the press and the media. Very few 
news reports would meet the threshold requirements. Furthermore, as 
indicated earlier, we disagree that the phrase "in accordance with section 
16(1) of the Constitution" applies to this part of the proviso and therefore do 
not agree with Marais and Pretorius that the defence could be extended to 
include other forms of expressive content.107 A proposed amendment is 
justified below. 
4.3.5 The publication of any information, advertisement or notice in 
accordance with section 16(1) of the Constitution 
Marais and Pretorius' examination of the component parts of this section of 
the proviso focuses mainly on the significance of the exclusion of "ideas" 
from the wording of the proviso.108 Regrettably, however, their analysis 
provides little insight into the forms of expression actually exempted from 
prohibition thereby. In our view, this part of the proviso applies specifically 
to section 12 and would find limited application in hate speech-type cases 
(although it is probable that some published advertisements, information or 
notices could promote group hatred). As indicated earlier, it appears that 
the drafters repeated the essence of section 12 and then precluded such 
forms of expression from liability if published "in accordance with section 
16(1) of the Constitution". The problem is that it is very difficult to determine 
the distinction between a notice, advertisement or information which falls 
foul of the Act and one which could be exempted because it was published 
in accordance with the constitutional right to freedom of expression. As 
Albertyn et al point out, "what the one hand seeks to capture, the second 
hand sets free".109 
                                            
105 See generally Independent Newspapers Holdings Ltd v Suliman 2004 3 All SA 137 
(SCA) paras 42-44; Modiri v Minister of Safety and Security 2012 1 All SA 154 (SCA) 
paras 20-24. 
106 Jersild v Denmark 1995 19 EHRR 1 (App No 15890/89). 
107  Marais and Pretorius 2015 PER 926. 
108  Marais and Pretorius 2015 PER 915-917. 
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Albertyn et al then suggest that this part of the proviso should be interpreted 
to provide that only advertisements, notices, and information that also fall 
within the definitional ambit of section 16(2) are prohibited by section 12. 
This interpretation, however, is strained in the light of the Act's objectives 
as a transformative and remedial piece of legislation.110 Furthermore, the 
heading of section 12 ("Prohibition of Dissemination and Publication of 
Information that Unfairly Discriminates") does not use any of the terminology 
used in section 16(2). It was clearly not intended to prohibit such speech 
only if it incites violence, advocates hatred or amounts to propaganda for 
war. 
We believe that when enacting section 12, the drafters wished to create a 
separate prohibition to regulate the broad use of discriminatory signs, 
advertisements and notices (as occurs in other jurisdictions) and the 
publication of discriminatory information. The proviso, however, does not 
clarify when these forms of speech would be worthy of exemption and is 
therefore meaningless. As indicated earlier, Marais and Pretorius argue that 
the "bona fide" requirement should also apply here.111 Whilst this suggestion 
offers a potential solution to the over-breadth problem, it is not a viable 
option as it is strained and not textually sound.112 Accordingly, we propose 
an amendment, as discussed below. 
4.6 The effect of the proviso applied to sections 10 and 12 
In summary, we argue that the proviso creates a defence for a respondent 
accused of contravening either sections 10 and 12. The respondent must 
prove that the expressive conduct in issue falls within the ambit of the 
proviso and that liability is accordingly precluded. The proviso thus limits the 
broad effect of sections 10 and 12, but because it is inadequately drafted 
and very narrow, it does not temper the fact that these prohibitions limit the 
freedom of expression in terms more extensive than section 16(2) of the 
Constitution. 
For section 10, the concern is that the communication of hurtful words on a 
prohibited ground against any person falls within its ambit and that the 
proviso exempts such expression only if it amounts to the bona fide 
engagement in artistic creativity, academic or scientific enquiry, or the bona 
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fide engagement in fair and accurate reporting in the public interest. So, for 
example, a fair and accurate news report in the public interest about the use 
of the slogan "Kill the Boer" would not be prohibited by section 10(1).113 
Likewise, in the context of a bona fide stand-up comedy production, a rude 
racial joke about the characteristics of white people would not be actionable. 
But, even interpreted so, the proviso does not overcome the problem that 
with many instances of offensive speech (not taking place in the context 
inter alia of news reporting, a dramatic production or an academic journal), 
the defence would find little application. As explained earlier, the latter part 
of the proviso ("the publication of any information, advertisement or notice 
in accordance with section 16 of the Constitution") was probably intended 
to apply only to section 12 of the Act. But, even if we are incorrect on this 
point, its meaning is vague and causes uncertainty. We therefore submit 
that the proviso is very narrow and that it is necessary to test the 
constitutionality of section 10(1) in terms of section 36 of the Constitution. 
5 The constitutionality of section 10(1), as read with the 
proviso 
Marais and Pretorius argue that section 10(1) is a constitutionally justified 
limitation to freedom of expression. In support of this contention, they claim 
that the type of expression captured by section 10 is of low value when 
assessed against the traditional rationales for the protection of freedom of 
expression.114 They explain that their interpretation of the provision's 
threshold test ensures that only a narrow range of discriminatory expression 
is regulated. The authors identify this type of expression as speech which 
unfairly promotes inequality in society and causes feelings of inferiority and 
marginalisation for historically disadvantaged groups. They suggest that the 
prohibition does not inhibit speakers from using other forms of speech to 
express "the hateful remarks section 10 prohibits".115 
We disagree. Whilst there is no doubt that hate speech, properly defined, 
cannot be tolerated in a democratic society and that such speech does not 
promote the values underpinning freedom of expression, hate speech 
prohibitions must be principled, informed and precisely crafted. The 
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regulation of hate speech creates a tension between the rights to freedom 
of expression, human dignity and equality. When formulating hate speech 
laws the challenge is to balance the competing rights, which balance cannot 
be attained by applying only the fairness standard for discrimination. 
Instead, the legitimacy of hate speech regulation in South Africa must be 
assessed in terms of a comprehensive balancing enquiry, which takes into 
account a wide range of factors including: respect for the rights of the victims 
of hate speech; autonomy for speakers; the causal link between hate 
speech and hatred in a community; the impact of hate speech on the 
democracy; and the desire to achieve a diverse, harmonious and tolerant 
society.116 
We submit that the existing section 10(1) prohibition, as read with the 
proviso, is vague, imprecise and over-reaches. The threshold test for hate 
speech contained therein creates a measure which is neither a reasonable 
and justifiable limitation to the freedom of expression (as tested in terms of 
section 36 of the Constitution), nor a clear, necessary or proportional 
restriction thereto (as required by Article 19(3) of the ICCPR). International 
practice dictates that States parties must justify all restrictions to the 
freedom of expression in terms of Article 19(3), showing that the limitation 
responds to a grave social need, that it is the least intrusive measure 
available, and that there is proportionality between the interest protected 
and the impairment of the freedom of expression.117 In addition, it is 
considered unacceptable State practice to enact vague and inconsistent 
domestic legislation with variable terminology, and States parties must 
ensure that all hate speech restrictions are precisely delineated.118 
Our primary concern is that the rational connection between section 10(1) 
and its purpose is missing and that it is not proportionate to the interest 
protected.119 As explained, the purpose of hate speech regulation is to 
control the dissemination of hatred in society and to overcome the resultant 
discrimination and stereotyping of vulnerable groups. Thus, the question of 
whether a hate speech restriction is legitimately connected to these aims 
must focus on the group and not merely the individual and the speech 
prohibited must also be likely to cause harm.120 Whilst harm caused to 
individual members of the group is not irrelevant, section 10(1) must be 
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aligned with the legislative objective of addressing the marginalisation of 
target groups and of promoting a tolerant, pluralistic and egalitarian 
society.121 Moreover, we believe that the many interpretative and 
constitutional challenges to the prohibited speech provisions in the Equality 
Act compromise their effectiveness. We therefore suggest an amendment 
to section 10. 
6 Proposals for the reform of section 10(1) 
We recommend that section 10(1) be amended to read as follows: 
No person may publish, propagate, or advocate any form of expression in 
public against an identifiable group of persons on one or more of the prohibited 
grounds that could reasonably be construed to demonstrate a clear intention 
to promote hatred against such group and which is likely to cause harm. 
The proposed wording excludes the communication of hurtful words 
directed at individuals based on group characteristics from the ambit of 
section 10(1). Instead, the focus is on the regulation on the promotion of 
group hatred, which also causes harm. We submit that a restriction to 
freedom of expression in these terms is a reasonable and justifiable 
limitation to the freedom of expression and is rationally connected to the 
legislative purpose of addressing the marginalisation of vulnerable groups 
and of promoting a tolerant, pluralistic and egalitarian society. 
The recommendation for a new threshold test for hate speech constrains 
the extent of the limitation to the freedom of expression, but a respondent 
should still be entitled to raise a defence. Here we recommend the insertion 
of new hate speech-specific defences in section 10 (as opposed to the 
proviso in section 12). We suggest that "the bona fide engagement in artistic 
creativity, scientific and academic enquiry" defence be retained. The media 
defence, however, is too narrow because it requires a respondent to prove 
that the speech was bona fide – that is, genuine; accurate (effectively 
excluding opinion or comment); reasonable and in the public interest. We 
recommend that a media respondent should be entitled to rely on the 
traditional "fair comment" defence to escape liability, provided that the 
engagement therein is bona fide, to be tested objectively and within context. 
Finally, we do not support the inclusion of a "truth" defence. Many 
academics argue that the advocacy of hatred is necessarily untrue.122 The 
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hatemonger claims that members of an identifiable group should be reviled 
because of abhorrent group characteristics. The Constitutional Court has 
reiterated that this type of conduct violates everyone's inherent human 
dignity and fails to respect the right to be different.123 In a defamation case, 
a defendant is entitled to plead that the publication is true and in the public 
interest, but hate speech and defamation should not be confused. A plaintiff 
in a defamation suit alleges an injury to reputation. A defendant, in turn, is 
entitled to prove that the publication was not wrongful because the 
published facts were true and in the public interest. The injury to the 
plaintiff's reputation was deserved and should be made known. But, in hate 
speech cases, a group is maligned because of immutable group 
characteristics. The inclusion of a truth defence enables a respondent "to 
repeat his or her odious claims and make them the subject of legal context" 
thereby shifting the focus from the hatred "to historical, sociological or 
psychological claims that are simply window dressing for more basic 
assertions" about group qualities.124 This cannot be tolerated. 
7 Conclusion 
Marais and Pretorius' analysis provides an interesting perspective on the 
meaning and constitutionality of section 10(1) of the Equality Act, 
specifically insofar as the role of the proviso is concerned. Their input in 
respect of a regularly overlooked area is invaluable. We do not agree, 
however, with their interpretation of the hate speech provisions. As we have 
demonstrated, hate speech and unfair discrimination are not analogous and 
the ambit of section 10(1) is far too wide, even when tempered by the 
proviso. 
We therefore propose a new and stricter test for the regulation of hate 
speech in the Equality Act. We also recommend that a new section 10(2) 
be inserted in the Act containing hate speech-specific defences. This 
structure, we submit, is infinitely better than the bifurcated approach 
currently used where the existing defences are contained in section 12, 
incorporated by way of a proviso. 
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We argue that our approach provides much needed clarity and ensures that 
hate speech is appropriately regulated in South Africa. Our revision of the 
section 10(1) test is narrowly tailored to regulate the public promotion of 
hatred against specified target groups, and which is likely to cause harm. 
We submit that this test complies with the benchmark for hate speech 
regulation in relevant international law. The restriction is clear and 
necessary, responds to a pressing social need, and is proportionate to the 
interest protected. It is precisely crafted and does not include offensive inter-
personal speech within its realm. It is capable of achieving its objectives and 
is aimed at facilitating the transformation to a reconciled nation united in its 
diversity. 
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